Experts: Is the End Near for Their Use by Burd, William G. & Lozano, Madelyn Simon
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 59 | Issue 1 Article 3
1993
Experts: Is the End Near for Their Use
William G. Burd
Madelyn Simon Lozano
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
William G. Burd et al., Experts: Is the End Near for Their Use, 59 J. Air L. & Com. 77 (1993)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol59/iss1/3
EXPERTS: IS THE END NEAR FOR THEIR USE?
WILLIAM G. BURD*
MADELYN SIMON LOZANO**
E XPERT WITNESSES have been around for centuries.
One of the first recorded uses of an expert witness ap-
pears in the Talmud, the ancient documentation ofJewish
law and tradition, compiled between 600 B.C. and 500
A.D. It seems a husband sought to divorce his wife. Un-
fortunately, no grounds existed. No matter. The re-
sourceful man simply arranged a party at which he got his
wife and all the guests drunk. He waited until his wife and
a gentleman guest passed out. He then carried them to a
couch and threw a clear, mucousy goo between them. He
immediately called the neighbors in to witness the messy
scene, exclaiming with outrage that his wife had commit-
ted adultery.
The wife, it turned out, was as resourceful as the hus-
band. When she sobered up and found out about the
trumped up charge, she did not just get mad, she got
even. Her physician was brought forth. He identified the
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incriminating substance as egg-white, not seminal fluid.
Although the Talmud does not so state, apparently the
husband could not find an expert to testify otherwise.
The case was closed. The wife prevailed. The expert wit-
ness was born.'
Over the centuries, the use and importance of expert
witnesses in resolving legal disputes has continually ex-
panded, always - ostensibly - with the noble goal of
helping the judge and jury to decide a case fairly and cor-
rectly. Yet today, many of us who practice aviation law
have had enough. We question whether the judicial pro-
cess has lost the ability to control the misuse and abuse of
expert witnesses. We all have horror stories involving ex-
pert witnesses. Cases where too many experts have been
used, where experts have been harassed by opposing
counsel, and where experts have been qualified on the
most mundane or off-the-wall issues, to name a few of the
gripes. Are we fed up and not going to take it anymore?
Is the end near for the use of experts? A historical per-
spective will help understand how we got to where we are
today and how we might improve the future.
A. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXPERT
WITNESS: FORM OVER SUBSTANCE THEN
The law of Germanic tribes was the source of English
primitive folk-law which appeared after 400 A.D.2 Experts
were not needed because primitive law employed a
pseudo-science of its own, a mechanical device which was
based on the wrath of God. Whereas today some experts
believe they are god, back then God was the expert.
Litigation had two stages: an issue term and a trial
term. During the issue term, the parties made allegations
IJames R. Richardson, Modern Scientific Evidence, § 1.8 (1961).
2 The sources consulted in researching the historical development of expert
witness use include: 7 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
(1978); ROSCOE POUND, THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW (3d ed.
1927); FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW (1923); 2 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1923).
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following very formalistic rules. Once the issue was nar-
rowed, the case proceeded to the trial term. No investiga-
tion of the facts was undertaken at trial. Rather, the
parties were subjected to an arbitrary, mechanical test
which was expected to reveal God's judgment.
Generally, the test was accomplished by way of oath,
compurgation, or ordeal. If the test was by oath or com-
purgation, oath helpers assisted a party by bolstering his
position and attesting to his truthfulness. The "scientific"
principle was very simple: he who told a lie was certain to
suffer God's wrath. Thus, there was great stake in telling
the truth. The test by ordeal was more complicated and
carried with it the potential for disaster. There were four
forms of ordeal: (1) by cold water; (2) by hot water; (3) by
hot iron; and (4) by the morsel. Before undergoing the
ordeal, the party went through a solemn religious cere-
mony in which Heaven was invited to watch over the pro-
ceedings and to decide the issue. The theory of the
ordeal was that a divine or supernatural power could
make truth manifest if that power were properly sought.
If the party put to the ordeal survived the torture, God
was on his side, and that party prevailed, even if crippled
for life.
Over time, as people saw the possibility of manipulating
the ordeal by collusion, as well as through general intel-
lectual advancement and the rise of more efficient meth-
ods at trial, public confidence in the ordeals waned.
Ultimately, during the reign of Henry III, in the thirteenth
century, the church was forbidden further involvement in
the elaborate religious ceremonies upon which the or-
deals depended. Trial by ordeal was abandoned in favor
of a primitive form of jury trial.
The jury trial system was founded in the Frankish kings'
courts which were used to decide revenue matters. The
practice was extended to land ownership issues and later
civil cases. Freemen of a particular locality made up the
,1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A KALEIDOSCOPE OF JUSTICE 5 (1941).
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jury panel. The manner of trial was inquisitorial, and the
jury system came to depend on facts to decide litigation.
In its beginnings, the jury served as truth tellers: they
stated what they knew to be the truth, not from evidence
heard, but from personal knowledge and the reputation of
the neighborhood. Facts were not provided by witnesses,
but were based on the knowledge of the jurors them-
selves. The jurors, in a manner, were the experts. By the
fourteenth century, the need for specialized knowledge in
judicial proceedings began to be recognized. At that
time, however, the expert was called to assist the judge,
not thejury. One of the expert's roles was to aid in select-
ingjury members whose experience made them especially
fit to know and understand the types of facts involved in
the case.4 Over time, the jury ceased to be witnesses and
became witness-triers. As the inquisitorial system gave
way to the adversary system, knowledge about the contro-
versy served to disqualify prospective jurors. By the six-
teenth century, witnesses were called to prove facts, and
experts were permitted to testify on behalf of a party. By
the eighteenth century, use of the partisan expert witness
was well established. 5 And it has been all downhill since
then.6 No, but seriously...
By 1902, the American legal community had begun to
criticize the use of expert witnesses and the opinion rule
upon which that use was founded. The esteemed Learned
Hand was one of the critics. Hand commented that "criti-
cism [of the rules regarding expert witnesses] comes with
I Learned Hand wrote of a 1555 case where an expert grammarian was re-
quired to assist the court in translating pleas into Latin. Learned Hand, Historical
and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REv. 40, 43
(1902). Hand further related a 1665 case involving an expert on witches. Dr.
Brown testified to the fact that the accused were witches, elaborating his opinion
by scientific explanation as to why they had fits. Id. at 46.
In 1782, expert testimony was endorsed in certain cases where "matters of
science" were involved. Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157 (1782).
,1 In his oft-quoted article on the subject, Mason Ladd wrote: "With the rise of
the adversary system in which witnesses were looked upon as being called by the
parties and expected to represent their position in the case, it was not surprising
that the use of scientific proof developed into testimonial battle of experts." Ma-
son Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L .REv. 414 (1952).
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great unanimity."' 7 He opined that the rules of evidence
regarding the manner in which expert witnesses could tes-
tify was an anomaly, which slipped through the cracks in
the development of evidence rules.8 He noted that rules
developed that excluded witnesses from stating opinions
or conclusions, but "the use of experts being established
and convenient, remained unaffected when other opinion
evidence disappeared."9 "The rise of expert testimony is
no more than the gradual recognition of such testimony,
amid the gradual definition of rules of evidence, as a per-
missible, because supposedly useful, archaism."' 0 In his
opinion, however, the expert witness "presents serious
practical difficulties.""
Hand went on to list his objections to the use of experts
- remember, this is 1902: "[F]irst, that the expert be-
comes a hired champion of one side; second, that he is the
subject of examination and cross-examination and of con-
tradiction by other experts."'12 Hand suggested that the
expert should be limited to relating only facts concerning
"uniform physical rules, natural laws, or general princi-
ples, which the jury must apply to the facts."' 3 He stated
that when the expert is allowed to give an opinion or con-
clusion, "[t]he expert has taken the jury's place if they be-
lieve him."' 4 The expert's role is to be witness, not
adviser.' 5 Hand noted that the jury is placed in an espe-
cially difficult situation when the experts themselves disa-
gree.' 6  "[H]ow can the jury judge between two
statements each founded upon an experience confessedly
foreign in kind to their own? It is just because they [the
jury] are incompetent for such a task that the expert is





I2 Hand, supra note 4, at 53.
I., Id. at 50.
1 Id. at 52.
15 Id. at 53.
16 Id. at 54.
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necessary at all."' 7 The author makes this forceful
conclusion:
One thing is certain, [the jury] will do no better with the
so-called testimony of experts than without, except where
it is unanimous. If the jury must decide between such they
are as badly off as if they had none to help. The present
system in the vast majority of cases ... is a practical clos-
ing of the doors ofjustice upon the use of specialized and
scientific knowledge. 18
Pretty strong stuff. But has the situation improved
since the turn of the century when the learned Hand
wrote? Some years after Hand addressed the issue, the
respected dean of the Harvard Law School, Roscoe Pound
wrote, "[u]nder the conditions of today, jury trial in civil
cases is expensive, dilatory and wasteful of the time of the
court and of the public."' 9 Dean Pound, interestingly,
observed that the civil jury had "fallen into disuse in
England, except for certain classes of wrongs where an
emotional element is legitimately involved. ' 20  Pound
considered the great amount of discretion left in the
hands of the trial judge to be a major cause for the abuses
of our American jury trial system. 2'
By 1937, the Model Expert Testimony Act had been
written. Before its measures would become law in 1975,
however, in the Federal Rules of Evidence 22 expert wit-
ness use rapidly and continuously expanded in direct pro-
portion to scientific developments and the application of
scientific methods of proof to ordinary issues. Then, as
now, a broad range of witnesses who possessed varying
degrees of expertise were permitted to state their opin-
'7 Hand, supra note 4, at 54.
'" Id. at 56. Hand cites the case of Alsop v. Bowtrell, Cro. Jac. 14 (1620), to
illustrate that perhaps a more enlightened use of experts occurred centuries ago.
He states that in Alsop the court first satisfied itself of the physicians' facts before it
told the jury they could do the same. Id. "Truly we have not in all respects ad-
vanced in two hundred and eighty years." Id. at 56 n. 1.
11 ROSCOE POUND, THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF COMMON LAW (3d ed. 1927).
211 Id. at 67.
21 Id.
22 FED. R. EVID. 702-06.
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ions. The weight given their testimony depended on the
qualification process and the foundation testimony. The
judge had broad discretion to determine an expert's qual-
ifications, and his decision was (as it is today) final, except
in a case of clear abuse.
B. THE HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF EXPERT DISCOVERY UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 26
For years, the use of the hypothetical question domi-
nated expert testimony. When an expert was highly
trained or educated in his field, but lacked personal obser-
vation, hypothetical questioning was the sole method for
questioning the witness.23 Through use of the hypotheti-
cal question, the foundational facts necessary to present
the expert testimony were generally established. 24 Practi-
cal difficulties arose, however, in formulating the hypo-
thetical. If any material fact was omitted or if any
statement included in the question had not been estab-
lished by the evidence, then the expert's opinion, based
on a faulty hypothetical, was itself inadmissible, or, if ad-
mitted, grounds for possible reversal. Obviously, in factu-
ally complicated cases, the question posed to an expert
had the potential to become long, convoluted, and more
likely to confuse the jury than help it. For example, in
United States v. Sessin,25 a hypothetical question took half an
hour to propound. An appeal was taken on the grounds
"that a few of the multitudinous statements of the hypoth-
esis lacked meticulous accuracy. "26
In addition to jury confusion, reliance on the hypotheti-
23 See JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 676 (3d ed. 1940).
24 Generally, a hypothetical question had to assume all facts disclosed by the
evidence material to the theory of the case as viewed from the side propounding
the question. Kale v. Douthitt, 274 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1960). A question which
assumed any material fact not supported by the evidence was inadmissible. Id. A
question which omitted any material fact essential to the formation of a rational
opinion or conclusion had to permit reasonably accurate conclusions as distin-
guished from mere guess or conjecture. Id.
2.5 84 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1936).
26 Id. at 669.
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cal question placed a heavy burden on the proponent of
the expert evidence sought to be admitted. Furthermore,
there was no procedural mechanism through which the
opposing party could obtain pre-trial discovery in order
to aid cross-examination of the expert. Until implementa-
tion of Rule 26 in 1970, the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provided no method to obtain discovery of experts
or the nature of the information upon which their testi-
mony was based.
Prior to the current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26,
a trial judge held strict control over a party's pre-trial ac-
cess to information concerning an opponent's experts. 7
The result was that discovery was denied in its entirety or
limited to extremely narrow areas in most cases. 28 There
were many grounds for denying discovery, including at-
torney-client privilege, 29 work product privilege, 3  and
"unfairness.13 1 In addition to providing needed informa-
tion for effective cross-examination, an added reason for
pre-trial discovery was raised: "the need for pretrial dis-
covery regarding expert witnesses is further evidenced by
the ever-increasing dissatisfaction with the honesty and
reliability of expert testimony .... 2
The implementation of Rule 26 provided for a uniform,
21 Still today a trial judge has broad discretion to admit an expert's opinion
evidence. Admissibility will be sustained unless manifestly erroneous. Michael H.
Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure, Evidence § 6641 (Interim ed. 1992).
28 See Jeremiah M. Long, Discovery and Experts Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 38 F.R.D. 111, 112 (1965).
- Schuyler v. United Airlines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 111, 113 (M.D. Pa. 1950)(treating
expert as agent of attorney).
30 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, (1947).
31 See Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21, 23 (W.D.Pa.
1940) (permitting deposition of opposing party's expert unfair and equivalent to
taking another's property without compensation). In contrast, in Seven-Up Bot-
tling Co. v. United States, 39 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.C. Colo. 1966), the court dismissed
the idea that it was unfair to allow discovery of an opposing expert because it
permits one party to learn through discovery what the other party has paid to
learn, with this comment: "Somehow it is believed that he [the proponent of the
expert] has bought and paid for the witness and that the other party should not
share in his property. We cannot accept this 'oath helper' approach to discovery."
.2 Jack H. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14
STAN. L. REV. 455, 485 (1962).
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orderly scheme of liberal discovery and adopted the doc-
trine of "fairness" as its guide. Subdivision (b)(4)(A) of
Rule 26 addresses trial preparation concerning experts."3
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, in its note ac-
companying the 1970 rule stated that the intent of the
drafters in broadening discovery:
In cases [which present intricate and difficult issues as to
which expert testimony is likely to be determinative], s4 a
prohibition against discovery of information held by ex-
pert witnesses produces in acute form the very evils that
discovery has been created to prevent. Effective cross-ex-
amination of an expert witness requires advance prepara-
tion .... [T]he only substitute for discovery of experts'
valuation materials is "lengthy - and often fruitless -
cross-examination during trial .... [Elffective rebuttal re-
quires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the
other side .
By limiting discovery to experts who will testify at trial,
the committee sought to balance the fear that one side
would unduly benefit from the other's better prepara-
tion. 6 Under Rule 26, a party may discover facts known
or opinions held by an opponent's expert who is not ex-
pected to testify at trial only upon a showing of excep-
tional circumstances which make it impractical for the
party seeking discovery to acquire the facts or opinion by
other means.3 7
Rule 26 sets forth a two-step process for discovery from
.13 Rule 26(b)(4)(A) states:
(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to
identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an ex-
pert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is
expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opin-
ions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the
grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the court may order
further discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to
scope and such provisions, pursuant to (b)(4)(C) of this rule, con-
cerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
14 Rule 26 applies equally, however, to complex and simple cases.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee Notes.
3f Id.
17 See Bottorffv. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 130 F.R.D. 97 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
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expert witnesses. First, written interrogatories must be
propounded to the party.38 The party is required,
through the interrogatories, to identify its expert wit-
nesses and to state the subject matter on which each ex-
pert is expected to testify, the substance of the facts and
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify, and a
summary of the grounds of each opinion.31 "Perhaps due
to trial courts' disgust with evasive and dilatory discovery
tactics, the case law reflects a trend toward requiring more
detailed and complete answers to expert witness interrog-
atories. ' ' 40 If a party seeks any other information from the
expert for impeachment purposes, that information can
only be obtained through deposition under the rule.4'
Second, when answers to expert witness interrogato-
ries are complete, a party may obtain further discovery of
an expert through depositions and document requests.
According to the rule, however, further discovery may be
made only upon motion and by order of the trial court.4 2
The intent of the rule is to avoid burdensome and unwar-
ranted discovery which may occur if depositions are un-
dertaken before interrogatories are completed.4a
Although the rule has theoretical foundation, its applica-
tion in practice has been difficult, especially to the party
and its expert who are at the receiving end of discovery
requests.
While providing pre-trial discovery of experts may en-
courage the opposing party to be certain that its expert is,
in fact, qualified and has a valid opinion to offer, permit-
ting broad discovery tends to provide the opportunity for
abuse and harassment of the person on the receiving end
."1 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
.41 Id.
4) United States v. Harless Aviation, 1991 WL 326639 (S.D. Ga. 1991) (court
ordered FAA to provide more complete answers to expert witness interrogatories
where responses given did not provide sufficient information for counsel to con-
duct further discovery).
It Bottorff, 130 F.R.D. at 97.
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
4, FED. R. Civ. P. Advisory Committee Notes.
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of the request. Obviously, discovery of an opponent's ex-
pert is necessary for effective cross-examination. On the
other hand, one of the main goals of cross-examination is
to discredit an expert personally.44 Rule 26 provides an
excellent mechanism to obtain the type of information
which has nothing to do with the case and everything to
do with harassing the expert.
It is not unusual for a party to seek information on an
opponent's expert regarding the expert's: (1) financial in-
terest in a case by asking about remuneration for serv-
ices,45 (2) continuing employment relationship with the
party on whose behalf the expert will testify,4 6 or (3) any
record of the expert's prior testimony for the same party
or attorney.47 Moreover, the trend is to permit discovery
directed towards establishing (1) the amount of prior
compensation the expert has received from the party; (2)
the percentage of total income the expert receives from
expert testimony per year; and (3) prior testimony for liti-
gants similarly situated to the party he currently
represents .48
Undeniably, a great deal of the discovery that is sought
to discredit the expert personally would be unnecessary if
the witness were confined to testimony concerning scien-
tific facts that are outside the understanding of thejury. It
is because the expert is permitted to state opinion, even
on the ultimate issue of fact, that opposing counsel seeks
damaging personal information to discredit the expert.
A pre-trial order entered in the case of In re Air Crash at
Stapleton Int'l Airport, Denver, Colorado, on November 15,
1987,40 provides a good example of the issues which may
arise when attempting to obtain discovery from expert
witnesses. The matter presented concerned the plaintiffs'
44 JAMES W. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY § 13.39 (1975).
1-1 Bottorf, 130 F.R.D. at 97.
41 Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708 (6th Cir. 1975).
41 See Sears v. Rutishauer, 466 N.E.2d 210 (Ill. 1984).
4 See GRAHAM, supra note 27, at 348-49.
4 720 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Colo. 1988), rev'd in part on other grounds, 964 F.2d 1059
(10th Cir. 1992).
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designated experts in aeronautical engineering, wing de-
sign and the effect of ice contamination on aircraft wings.
In accord with previous orders by the court, defendants
noticed two of the experts for deposition. The notices in-
cluded requests for production of various documents in
the experts' possession.
At the depositions, plaintiffs objected to the following
requests: all materials possessed by the experts relating to
the case; all written records of communications between
plaintiffs' attorneys and the experts in the case; copies of
all trial and deposition transcripts of other cases where
the experts testified. In addition, plaintiffs' counsel ad-
vised the experts to refuse to answer any questions on the
issue of the experts' own relationship and their relation-
ship with the plaintiffs' law firm. Plaintiffs' argument in
refusing to cooperate with this discovery was that the
scope of expert discovery is limited to documents the ex-
pert relies on in preparing his testimony and opinion.
Plaintiffs argued that the attorney work product privilege
protected certain records of the experts' opinions. De-
fendants countered that they were entitled to discover the
records and information requested for purposes of
impeachment.
The trial court held that information sought relevant to
an expert's impeachment at trial is limited to materials
possessed by the expert which are related to the case at
hand.5" The court found that any materials an expert re-
views in forming his opinion, even those he later disre-
gards, are relevant for impeachment. 5' "Specifically, the
Rule does not limit discovery to documents which support
an expert's opinion. In forming an opinion, an expert 're-
lies' upon material he finds unpersuasive as well as mate-
rial supporting his ultimate position. 52
As to the claim of attorney work product privilege, the
court held that the privilege is superseded by the discov-




erability of expert information.5 3 The court reasoned,
"[a]n expert who was not an eye witness to the events
about which he will testify obtains the majority of the ma-
terial he considers through the attorneys who employ
him."154 The court said that if the attorney work product
privilege could be raised in such situations, it would be an
"impenetrable shield" to prohibit obtaining impeachment
information.5 5 According to this case, even if the docu-
ments requested contain an attorney's mental impres-
sions, those impressions are discoverable if they were
reviewed by the expert before the expert opinion was
formed.56
The court in Air Crash at Stapleton did rule that defend-
ants' sweeping request for all materials and prior testi-
mony dealing in any way with the experts' aeronautical
experience was too burdensome and beyond the scope of
Rule 26Y The judge reasoned that permitting such unre-
lated litigation to enter into the case at hand was totally
irrelevant and that defendants were not entitled to inquire
into the relationships between the two experts or be-
tween the experts and the plaintiffs' attorney.58
In sum, due to the creative uses of Rule 26, it is some-
times difficult to remember that the rule was devised as a
procedural mechanism intended to inject a pre-trial
breath of fresh air into the use of expert witnesses, to do
away with the need for the hypothetical question, and to
simplify the trial process. The rule's effect on litigation
practice today has greatly increased the complexity of
cases, compounded the use of experts, increased the cost
of litigation, and, to say the least, raised the blood pres-
53 Id.




58 Id. at 1445; see County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 122 F.R.D. 120
(E.D.N.Y. 1988)(holding that memoranda between expert and attorney was dis-
coverable as were all documents that expert wrote or looked at in forming his
opinion, but diaries, notebooks and calendars were not discoverable).
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sure of many attorneys and experts within the reach of its
tentacles.
C. THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 702
THROUGH 706 ON EXPERT USE
As Rule 26 increased the availability of discovery con-
cerning experts, criticism mounted against use of the hy-
pothetical question and other traditional foundational
hoops through which counsel had to jump prior to put-
ting on expert evidence. 59 In a further effort to satisfy
criticism of hypothetical question use, and in order to re-
fine expert witness use at trial, Federal Rules of Evidence
702 through 705 were implemented in 1975.60 Specifi-
cally Rule 705 eliminates the need for hypothetical ques-
tions and allows an expert to "testify in terms of opinion
or inference and give reasons therefor without prior dis-
closure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court
requires otherwise."' 6' Cross-examination thus has be-
come the means to reveal such underlying facts. Rule 703
states that the underlying facts or data need not be admis-
sible if evidence is "of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or infer-
ences upon the subject .... 6 Rule 702 addresses the
admissibility of expert testimony.6 3
59 Criticism of the hypothetical question existed on all sides.. As stated in
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, Evidence § 16 (1984):
The hypothetical question is an ingenious and logical device for en-
abling the jury to apply the expert's scientific knowledge to the facts
of the case. Nevertheless, it is a failure in practice and an obstruc-
tion to the administration ofjustice. If we require that it recite all
relevant facts, it becomes intolerably wordy. If we allow, as most
courts do, the interrogating counsel to select such of the material
facts as he sees fit, we tempt him to shape a one-sided hypothesis.
Those expert witnesses who have given their views seem to agree
that this partisan slanting of the hypothesis is the fatal weakness of
the practice.
'1' FED. R. EvID. 702-05.
61 FED. R. EVID. 705.
61 FED. R. EVID. 703.
6,3 Federal Rule of Evidence 704 provides that expert testimony that touches on
and expresses an opinion on an ultimate issue of fact is not objectionable if it is
helpful to the trier of fact.
[59
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Before Federal Rule of Evidence 702 came into exist-
ence, Frye v. United States 64 set forth the test of admissibil-
ity of scientific evidence. Under Frye, scientific evidence
could not be admitted unless it was "sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs. ' 65 A party seeking to introduce
expert testimony had to prove that the "community" of
experts considered the scientific knowledge upon which
the testimony was based to be reliable and valid.66 With
the advent of the Federal Rules of Evidence on expert tes-
timony, however, the Frye test was no longer the only
game in town. The test became one of balancing the
helpfulness of the expert testimony against any relevance
or prejudice which it might cause the opposing party. In
this sense, Rule 702 does little to define the parameters of
a trial judge's discretion in admitting all kinds of alleged
expert testimony. The rule expands more than limits a
trial judge's discretion in admitting all types of experts
and all types of evidence through experts.
Under Rule 702, expert testimony is admissible as long
as the trial judge rules that it is likely to assist the trier of
fact. This means that expert testimony is admissible even
where the jury needs no help in understanding the issue
the expert addresses. 67 Under Rule 702, neither educa-
tion, experience, nor formal training of any sort is neces-
sary to qualify one as an expert. In fact, the term
"expert" is actually a word of art; the more exact term is
"skilled" or "experienced" witness. This is true because
according to the rule, a person skilled or possessing spe-
cialized knowledge in a given area meets the definition of
an expert.68 The trial judge, however, applies Rule 104(a)
- 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
w Id. at 1014.
66 See Mercado v. Ahmed, 756 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Ill. 1991), for an excellent
discussion of application of the scientific concepts of reliability and validity to
both the Frye test of admissibility and Rule 702.
67 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides a safeguard against abuse under Rule
702 by prohibiting the admission of irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence.
' See Hammond v. International Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 653 (3d Cir.
19931
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to decide if a witness has sufficient qualifications to be an
expert. Discretion abounds, and an appellate court will
generally defer to a trial judge's decision on the issue. Ac-
cordingly, in Schroeder v. Boeing Commercial Airplane Co. ,69 a
plaintiff designated 18 experts in what should have been a
simple slip and fall case.
The final words in Rule 702 permit an expert to testify
in the form of an opinion "or otherwise. "70 Such broad
language, although merely a codification of existing com-
mon law, indicates that not only was Learned Hand's pro-
posal that experts be limited to testifying to facts ignored
by the committee which drafted the federal rules, but in-
stead, the opposite is true. An expert is expected to give an
opinion. He might also provide the jury with factual data
or give background information in a technical area. Of
course, opposing counsel then has the right to introduce
an expert with a contrary opinion. The result is just as
Hand posited: The jury is seldom helped at all, but is sim-
ply more confused. Their heads spinning, it is under-
standable that jurors might seek to evaluate the experts in
a context they can understand. Thus, an expert's manner
of speech, dress, and appearance may be much more de-
terminative of his/her believability than any amount of re-
search or knowledge the witness may possess.
In 1983, the Litigation Section of the American Bar As-
sociation produced a document which reviewed the rules
on experts, yet it did not consider this state of affairs a
problem.7 ' In Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the panel wrote, "[t]ogether with Rule 703, pro-
viding an expert may rely on certain data that might not
be independently admissible, and Rule 705, which per-
mits an expert to offer an opinion before providing sup-
porting data, Article VII offers litigants opportunities to
1982)(holding salesman of farm tractors qualified as expert on tractor design
defects).
-' 123 F.R.D. 166 (D.N.J. 1988).
70 FED. R. EvID. 702.
7' AMERICAN BAR AsSOCATION, LITIGATION SECTION (1903).
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make expert testimony as helpful as possible. '7 2 Not to
mention as confusing as possible.
Thus, it is up to the trial judge to apply discretion in
qualifying one as an expert." In Haley v. Pan American
World Airways74 the plaintiff, parents of an adult passenger
killed in the Kenner, Louisiana plane crash on July 9,
1982, were awarded damages for their son's' pre-impact
fear. All passengers and crew on the flight perished; thus,
the plaintiffs presented evidence on this claim through the
testimony of their expert witness, a psychiatrist who had
treated survivors of aircraft accidents and was familiar
with the physiological effects of stress. The expert ex-
plained the five levels of anxiety which culminate in panic,
and then opined that most, if not all, the people on the
flight were in an absolute state of pandemonium for at
least four to six seconds between the time they realized
they were going to crash (the expert said this occurred
when the plane's wing hit a tree) and the fatal impact.
On appeal, Pan Am contended that the trial judge
abused his discretion in admitting the expert's evidence
on the issue of pre-impact pain and suffering. The Fifth
Circuit disagreed and affirmed the trial court.75 While
recognizing that other courts have disallowed recovery for
pre-impact fear in similar cases based on a lack of evi-
dence, the court found that admission of the expert's evi-
dence, while arguably "irrelevant or within the ken of the
72 Id. at 202-03.
13 In Mercado, 756 F. Supp. at 1100, the plaintiff sought to have an economist
testify as an expert on "hedonic damages," the monetary value of pleasure of life
of an accident victim. In a well reasoned opinion, the trial judge reached beyond
the Rules of Evidence and applied the Frye test. The judge analyzed the require-
ments of reliability and validity to determine whether such evidence was admissi-
ble by assessing the degree to which the discipline is characterized by reliability
among practitioners and by validation of its theories. Id. at 1100-01. Stating that
"[tihe risk to justice from pseudo-science is substantial," the trial court held that
there was "no basic agreement among economists as to what elements ought to
go into the life valuation" and thus granted defendant's motion to bar such expert
testimony. Id. at 1102-03.
74 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984).
75 Id. at 319.
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layman-juror," was not an abuse of discretion.76 Thus,
based on that evidence plus the defendant airline expert's
acknowledgment that the passengers were fighting for
their lives when the plane's wing hit the tree, the $15,000
damage award was affirmed."
In contrast, the same Fifth Circuit in the case of In re Air
Crash Disaster at New Orleans, Louisiana,78 undertook a more
considered analysis in reviewing whether the trial judge
had abused his broad discretion by admitting an expert
economist's opinion that the lost inheritance to three chil-
dren whose parents perished in an air crash was
$1,778,873. The economist had based his projections on
analysis of the decedent father's tax returns and other fi-
nancial information. The Fifth Circuit recognized that
deference should be given the trial judge's decision to
find the expert qualified and competent to assist the
jury.79 On the other hand, the court stated:
Basic policy questions that affect the very nature of a trial
lie behind decisions to receive expert testimony. Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, experts not only explain
evidence, but are themselves sources of evidence. These
two roles, though related, are quite distinct. In deciding
whether explanation by an expert will assist the jury or
judge, the superior position of the trial judge over the ap-
pellate judge is apparent. By comparison, in deciding
whether evidence should be allowed from this source, the
trial judge draws less upon the scene and the case immedi-
ately before him, and more upon the substantive law. To
the extent that the decision to allow expert testimony as a
source of evidence is significantly intertwined with the un-
derlying substantive law, we will accord it less deference,
and take a much closer look.80
Having outlined its method of analysis, the court fur-
ther elaborated that a trial judge must be wary of an ex-
76 Id. at 316 n.10.
77 Id. at 319.
7, 795 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1986).
71, Id. at 1233.
80 Id.
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pert who is proffered to the jury to speak on an ultimate
issue because "the ultimate issue . . . can too easily be-
come whatever an expert witness says it is.""1 The court
reprimanded trial judges who take the easy road and per-
mit any and all expert testimony to come in "with the
shorthand remark that the jury will give it 'the weight it
deserves.' ",82 The court recognized that "the signals of
competence cannot be catalogued" and that the detection
of qualified experts depends on the "good sense and in-
stincts" of the trial judge.8 3 The court noted, for exam-
ple, that many experts are academicians who supplement
their income with consulting work.8 4 It pointed out that
in some cases such witnesses are willing to state in court
an opinion which would not be publishable in an aca-
demic or scientific journal because the theory does not
stand up to peer review.8 5 The court stated that this was
but one signal that the witness offered as an expert may
not be qualified. 6
The Fifth Circuit, in sum, decried the "let it all in" phi-
losophy and sent a message to trialjudges: "[I]t is time to
take hold of expert testimony in federal trials."8 7 With
that, the economist's testimony was dismissed as specula-
tive, the award based on that evidence was reversed, and
the case remanded for a new trial on that issue.8 8
1 Id.
82 Id.
s3 Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d at 1234.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. The court also commented that, while the professional expert is com-
monplace and, standing alone, not grounds for disqualification, the presence of
such a fact should be scrutinized. "[Elxperts whose opinions are available to the
highest bidder have no place in a court of law." Id.; see Snyder v. Whittaker Corp.,
839 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1988).
'7 Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d at 1234.
"I Id. at 1237. The plaintiff in Robertson v. McCloskey, 676 F. Supp. 351, 352
(D.D.C. 1988), proposed to introduce testimony of an expert in the "psychody-
namics of memory and perception." In plain English, plaintiff's expert was to
testify that people forget things over time. The trial judge found that the pro-
posed testimony concerned "matters that are squarely within the comprehension
of the average juror." Id. at 354. Moreover, the judge noted that if plaintiff's
expert testimony were admitted, defendant would have the right to call his own
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The case of Apostol v. U.S.,89 provides another example
of Rule 702's limits. Apostol stands for the following prop-
osition: "Once an expert not always an expert." 90 In that
case, plaintiff sought to have his air traffic control expert
qualified merely by informing the court that the witness
had testified in other cases as an expert. The trial court
did not buy it. Pointing out that the witness had not con-
trolled an airplane since 1953, some 25 years prior to the
trial, the court did not accept plaintiff's "remarkable
proposition that a court is bound to qualify as an expert
someone who testified as an expert in other cases."' The
court, apparently having done its own research, noted
that in a more recent case than that relied upon by plain-
tiff; the alleged expert had been "thoroughly discredited
. . . because of his lack of experience in air traffic
controlling. "92
Examples abound of cases, however, where arguably
prejudicial and irrelevant expert testimony was sought to
be admitted under Rule 702. Consider, for example:
The "Attention K-Mart Shoppers" Expert: Plaintiff, who
claimed injury when she apparently got caught up in a K
Mart Blue Light Special stampede for Cabbage Patch
dolls, attempted to introduce the testimony of an expert
on K Mart's negligent merchandising techniques. The
trial court determined that the jury did not need the
help.9 3
expert on the subject and the battle of the experts would be excruciatingly pro-
longed. Id. at 354-55.
By way of contrast, in Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir.
1986), a human factors expert was found qualified and permitted to introduce
statistical evidence that people wearing high heels tend to avoid walking over
grates on sidewalks. (There are actually statistical studies on such behavior.) The
appellate court found the admission of such evidence on a matter obviously within
the common knowledge of jurors to be harmless error. Id. at 1055. In the
meantime, a party and her expert were successful in getting such evidence before
a jury.
'" 838 F.2d 595 (1st Cir. 1988).
I' d. at 599 n.4.
Id.
92 Id.
" Rossman v. K Mart Corp., 701 F. Supp. 1127 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
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The "Liar, Liar Pants on Fire" Expert: A somewhat new
category of witness involves experts who seek to testify as
to the truthfulness of other experts. Human lie detectors,
if you will. While the reported cases deal mostly with
criminal defendants,94 the strategy has also been tried in
civil cases.9 5
Do we really need an expert here? Testimony of experts was
deemed necessary to enable a jury to understand the
meaning of the "technical" terms "fair," "reasonable,"
and " non-discriminatory. ' 96 The case of What do you mean
by that? A securities expert testified as to the meaning of
the term "best efforts" in a contract dispute.9 7
The case of "We see, but can you make it more complicated?"
Howard Cosell wrote a book about boxing. The World
Boxing Council got miffed and charged him with libel.
The Council sought to have an expert testify as to Cosell's
state of mind when he wrote certain parts of his book. No
one ever accused him of being a literary genius, but Cosell
got upset when the Council sought to introduce the testi-
mony of a linguistics expert to explain what Cosell meant
in his book. Perhaps the Council considered Cosell, the
writer, and his topic so profound that a jury could not un-
derstand either without the help of a linguist. The trial
judge disagreed, to put it mildly. "[The expert's] testi-
mony would waste the time of both the jury and the court
.... [i]t transforms a common sense issue into a technical
one, and relies on virtually incomprehensible pseudo-sci-
- See United States v. Sorondo, 845 F.2d 945 (11 th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Azure, 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986).
" See Carver v. Orange County, 444 So.2d 452 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); cf. Schwab
v. Tolley, 345 So.2d 747 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)(trial court properly struck testimony
of one expert who where he expressed an opinion as to what another expert
would think); Ecker v. National Roofing of Miami, Inc., 201 So.2d 586 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1967)(reversible error to permit defendant's expert to testify as to the pro-
fessional reputation of the plaintiffs expert).
1w, Nucor Corp. v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 891 F.2d 1343, 1350 (8th Cir.
1989)(in customer's breach of contract claim against electric utility based on elec-
tric rate overcharges).
'1 Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
861 (1977).
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entific jargon." The testimony was excluded.9
The "I swear, he's worth it," way of proving damages: An
economist was permitted to opine as to a stevedore's lost
wages without having referred at all to the records and the
facts of the case. The Fifth Circuit found admission of
the testimony to be error and stated, "[The expert's] testi-
mony on direct and cross examination was confusing at
best and nothing .... in the record clarifies how the econ-
omist reached his end result figures." 99
D. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703
If Rule 702 has the potential to be more hindrance than
help, consider Rule 703. This rule opens the door to the
admission of hearsay evidence through an expert's testi-
mony. Not only may an expert impinge on the jury's
province and provide a major premise in a case in the
form of an opinion or an inference on an issue which it is
for the jury to decide, he can base his opinion on inad-
missible evidence. What is to keep a party from doing
this? Solely the trial judge and his or her broad reaching
discretion. Admittedly this rule was put in place to
counter the criticism of the hypothetical question. The
question is: Does it do more harm than good?
Rule 703 does require that the facts or data upon which
the expert bases his opinion be of the type "reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field" of the wit-
ness's expertise. 00 Nevertheless, the rule is silent as to
whether the expert may tell the jury the factual basis of his
opinion if the facts are not independently admissible into
evidence. Thus, the bottom line is again the trial judge's
discretion, tempered by Rule 403's general bar against
the admission of unduly prejudicial evidence.
World Boxing Council v. Cosell, 715 F. Supp. 1259, 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Randolph v. Laeisz, 896 F.2d 964, 967 (5th Cir. 1990).
110 FED. R. EVID. 703. "The term 'reasonably' employed in Rule 703 implies a
judicial determination of trustworthiness. If solely routine reliance was intended,
either the term 'customarily'; or 'regularly' could have been selected." GRAHAM,
supra note 27, at § 6651 n.13.
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An example of the interplay of Rules 703 and 403 is
found in Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,1o1 To prove its
claim of product defect, plaintiff's attorney attempted to
introduce evidence of a previous airplane accident in St.
Anne, Illinois involving one of defendant's planes. Plain-
tiff claimed the St. Anne crash was substantially similar to
the crash at issue. Applying Federal Evidence Rule 403,
the trial judge excluded the testimony after balancing its
probative value against its prejudicial effect. 0 2 The judge
found the facts of the two accidents were not sufficiently
similar.10 3 Plaintiff then sought to introduce the same evi-
dence through its expert witness, pursuant to Rule 703,
claiming that its expert had relied on evidence of the St.
Anne accident to form his opinion as to the cause of the
accident at issue. The trial court excluded introduction of
the evidence through this technique, again relying on
Rule 403.104
The opposite result occurred in the case of In re Aircrash
in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 1 5 The trial judge had
not allowed plaintiff's expert to bring before the jury
otherwise inadmissible evidence of the accident pilot's
training records which contained double and triple hear-
say. The appellate court reversed, however, finding that
defendant's expert had opened the door to the admission
of such evidence though its own expert's testimony re-
garding the role of training records in the investigation of
the accident, as well as his testimony that all of Pan Am's
pilots, including the pilot in question, were competent.0 6
Similarly, in Rossi v. Mobil Oil Corp. ,107 Rule 703 was the
basis for allowing into evidence a retailer's expert's
monthly financial statements from which damage esti-
mates were derived, even though the statements were not
,,, 847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1988).
102Id. at 1267.
lo., Id. at 1269.
104 Id. at 1267.
10 684 F. 2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989).
I, d. at 1315.
107 710 F.2d 821 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983).
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compilations of regularly kept business records, but were
specifically prepared for trial. The appellate court af-
firmed the trial judge's ruling that the otherwise inadmis-
sible evidence could be brought in by an expert pursuant
to Rule 703.108 Moreover, the court found this not to be
unfair since the defendant was able to attack the testi-
mony during the expert's cross-examination and in clos-
ing argument. 109
Finally, in Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 0 the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed a ruling which excluded an econom-
ics expert's testimony on future gifts a deceased son
would have made to his mother. The court affirmed the
trial judge who had based his decision on the interplay
between Rules 703 and 403.'11 The trial judge had con-
cluded that the testimony "would seriously prejudice,
mislead and confuse thejury."' 12 The appellate court af-
firmed the trial court by finding that under Rule 703, the
trial judge correctly denied admission of the testimony
which was based on unrealistic and contradictory assump-
tions of facts." 3
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 705
Rule 705, also a response to criticism of the hypotheti-
cal question, addresses the disclosure of facts or data un-
derlying expert opinion. Pursuant to the rules, once an
expert is qualified, he can simply state his opinion without
more."14 The responsibility of the opposing party,
through cross-examination, is to bring out the informa-
tion upon which the expert based his opinion. 'In other
words, the cross'examiner is the source through which an
opposing party may get otherwise inadmissible hearsay
evidence brought before the jury. It should be pointed
'" Id. at 831.
i0') Id
I" 727 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1984).
I' Id. at 208.
112 Id. at 205.
1,3 Id. at 208.
-4 FED. R. EvID. 705.
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out, however, that a safeguard to the misuse of experts is
that the party offering the expert will usually provide a
foundation for his expert's testimony because testimony
which consists of no more than a conclusory opinion will
probably carry little weight with a jury."I5
Regardless, the elimination of reliance on the hypothet-
ical question virtually lifted the burden of admitting ex-
pert evidence from its proponent, once the expert is
qualified. The effect of Rule 705, as well as Rule 703, is to
"place the full burden of exploration of facts and assump-
tions underlying the testimony of the expert witness
squarely on the shoulders of opposing counsel's cross-
examination." " 16
E. PROPOSED CHANGES TO EVIDENCE RULE 702 AND
PROCEDURAL RULE 26
A review of the development of expert witness use is
instructive in order to put in perspective the role of the
expert witness in our adversarial trial system. Today,
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and rules
702 through 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence are
clear guideposts from which to begin to analyze any strat-
egy to improve the use of experts in the future. In fact,
the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules recently proposed various amendments both to the
Federal Evidence and Civil Procedure Rules regarding ex-
perts. Specifically, revisions have been proposed to Fed.
"5 Moreover, Rule 26(b)(4), providing for discovery of the expert witness, pro-
tects against undue surprise, thus allowing for more effective cross-examination.
FED. R. EVID. 26(b)(y). Such pre-trial discovery can also cut an opponent off at the
pass in his attempt to get certain evidence before a jury through an expert. For
example, in In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport on Aug. 16, 1987,
130 F.R.D. 652, 653 (E.D. Mich. 1989), Northwest Airlines was prohibited from
introducing a tower tape its expert relied on because the airline did not disclose
the tape as required in a pre-trial order.
I Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 793 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting
Michael H. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Part One, an Analytical Study, U. ILL. L. REV. 895, 897 (1976)); see
First of Am. Bank-Central v. United States, 639 F. Supp. 446, 461-62 (W.D.Mich.
1986)(cross-examination of wake turbulence expert and air traffic control expert
proved neither was qualified to testify).
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R. Civ. P. 26 and to Fed. R. Evid. 702. ' 7 In September
1992, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure submitted its final report on the proposed
amendments to the Judicial Conference of the United
States.
The committee acted upon the concern that expert tes-
timony had gotten out of hand, thus dangerously and un-
necessarily raising the costs of litigation without
providing a justifiable benefit to the fact finder." 8 The
committee has proposed to revise Rule 26 with the aim of
reducing the need for formal discovery requests to obtain
information on experts to be used at trial. ' 9 The Rule 26
changes also authorize depositions of experts without a
court order (as is the practice in most courts). 20 One
goal of the amendments, however, is to reduce the need
for depositions altogether by requiring the expert to af-
firmatively state both the details of his testimony and
other information regarding the expert's relation to the
case and the party he represents.' 2'
Specifically, the revised Rule 26(a)(2) would require
that a party disclose any expert "retained or specially em-
ployed to provide expert testimony in the case" or any
employee who regularly gives such testimony as part of
his or her duties. 22 The expert would then be required to
submit a report to opposing counsel containing a com-
plete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the
basis for those opinions. The report must detail the data
and other information considered by the witness in form-
ing the opinion, as well as provide any exhibits to be used
at trial. Moreover, the report must contain the qualifica-
tions of the witness, including a list of all publications he
117 137 F.R.D. 56 (1991).




22 The committee notes point out that subdivision (a)(2) does not apply to
treating physicians or nominal experts who are not specially retained to testify at
trial.
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has written within the last ten years; the compensation to
be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any
other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert
at trial or by deposition within the preceding four
years.123
After submitting the report, the expert can be deposed,
if necessary. The intent of the revision, however, is to re-
quire the report to be so specific that no deposition will
be required.
Implementation of the Rule 26 revisions will surely
streamline discovery of the technical and factual data
upon which an expert bases his opinion. Nevertheless,
the revisions do little to curb discovery abuses which oc-
cur when opposing counsel goes hunting for cross-exami-
nation information to discredit an expert personally. The
advisability of limiting all expert discovery to that con-
tained within the revised Rule 26 is questionable.
Recognizing that expert testimony is subject to misuse
as a trial technique to wear down adversaries, the Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure has also pro-
posed to change Federal Evidence Rule 702.24 The goal
is to limit expert witness use at trial.' 25 The revision pro-
vides that expert testimony is limited to information that
is "reasonably reliable" and that will "substantially assist"
the trier of fact. 126 According to the committee, this revi-
sion should curb excessive use of expert testimony which
lacks even marginal acceptance within the scientific
community. 127
12.1 137 F.R.D. at 89. No specific time limits for providing the expert report are
set by the revised rule; however, the committee notes state that in most cases, the
party with the burden of proof on an issue should disclose its expert testimony
before other parties. Subsection (a)(2)(C) does require that disclosures be made
at least 90 days before trial by the party with the burden of proof on the issue,
and 30 days before trial by the party who contradicts the subject matter. Pro-
posed Rule 26(c) states that timely supplementation of disclosures is required
where there are changes to the expert opinion. 137 F.R.D. at 96.
124 137 F.R.D. at 156.
.1 Id. (Committee Notes).
126 Id.
27 Id. at 157.
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In its notes, the committee recognizes that, while the
Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in order to ex-
pand expert use to illuminate technical issues in dispute,
the use of expert testimony has greatly increased and be-
come subject to abuse. 12  The committee notes point out
that the Rule 702 change does not mandate a return to
the Frye test which required general acceptance of the sci-
entific premise on which the testimony was based before
expert testimony would be admissible.12 1 "However, the
court is called upon to reject testimony that is based upon
premises lacking any significant support and acceptance
within the scientific community, or that otherwise would
be only marginally helpful to the fact-finder."' I3 0
E. THE LITTLE-USED EVIDENCE RULE 706: THE FUTURE
OF EXPERT WITNESS USE?
While the proposed changes to the rule regarding ex-
pert witnesses provide positive steps toward eliminating
expert witness abuse, there already exists a, until now, lit-
tle used rule of evidence that may foretell the future for
expert witness use. It is Federal Rule of Evidence 706
which permits the court to order the appointment of an
expert on its own motion or that of any party.' 3 ' The wit-
ness may be agreed on by the parties or selected by the
judge.13 2
Upon the expert's agreement to serve, the court, with
the participation of the parties, sets forth in writing the
128 Id. at 156.
129 Id. at 157.
1 30 Id. The second proposed change to Rule 702 simply complements the pro-
posed amendments to Civil Rule 26 by providing that expert information not dis-
closed in advance of trial as required by Rule 26 cannot be used on direct
examination without leave of court for good cause. Id.
Similarly, the committee proposed to change Federal Rule of Evidence 705 to
avoid any possible conflict with the revised Rule 702 and Rule 26. 137 F.R.D. at
158. Rule 705 would continue to permit an expert to state his opinion in court
without testifying to underlying facts or data. Nevertheless, the contents of the
expert's opinion would have to have been previously disclosed to opposing coun-
sel in order for the testimony to be admissible. Id. (Committee Notes).
1.1 FED. R. EvID. 706(a).
132 Id.
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expert's duties. 3 3 It is then the expert's role to advise the
parties of his or her findings, if any.' 3 4 The parties may
take the witness' deposition, and any party or the court
may call the witness to testify, subject to cross-examina-
tion.'3 5 The court, in its discretion, may authorize disclo-
sure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the
expert witness. 3 6
While Rule 706 was not implemented until 1975, the
use of a court appointed expert is hardly new. S7 It will be
remembered that the expert witness was originally em-
ployed as a non-partisan aide to the court. s'3  Learned
Hand advocated such experts in his seminal 1902 arti-
cle.' 39 In his 1952 article on expert testimony, Mason
Ladd cited the case of In re Dolbeer's Estate,140 where the
court stated:
The remedy [to misuse of experts] can only come when
the state shall provide that the courts, and not the liti-
gants, shall call a disinterested body or board of experts,
who shall review the whole situation and then give their
opinion, with their reasons therefore, to the court and
jury, regardless of the consequences to either litigant."'
Regardless of its logical appeal, no organized plan for
the use of impartial expert witnesses in civil cases was un-
dertaken until 1956 when the Association of the Bar of
133 Id.
134 Id.
1s. Id. According to Rule 706, compensation of the expert witness is deter-
mined by the court and paid by the parties according to the court's directions.
FED. R. EVID. 706(a); see National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Risk
Exchange, Inc., 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16936 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)(where cost of court
appointed expert got out of control).
156 FED. R. EvID. 706(d).
1.7 Prior to the implementation of Rule 706, power to appoint an expert was
found within the inherent authority of the court. Today, where an expert is not
called as a witness, the authority to appoint the expert derives also from the
court's inherent authority, not from Rule 706. See Reed v. Cleveland Board of
Education, 607 F.2d 737, 746 (6th Cir. 1979).
138 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the use of medical
experts).
1s Hand, supra note 4, at 56.
14o 86 P. 695, 702 (1906).
14' Ladd, supra note 6, at 429 n.50.
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New York City issued its report and recommendations on
the use of impartial medical testimony in medical mal-
practice lawsuits. 142 As the committee notes to Rule 706
point out, attorneys are reluctant to seek the appointment
of an impartial expert because of the fear that the expert
acquires an aura of unmerited infallibility. 43 Such fear is
probably especially intense when the party opposing the
expert fears the witness will fail to support that party's
theory of the case. 144
The Rules Committee recognizes that even though ac-
tual court appointment of an expert is rare, "[t]he availa-
bility of the procedure in itself decreases the need for
resorting to it."' 45 Rule 706, Notes of Advisory Commit-
tee on 1972 Proposed Rules. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. 146 illustrates this point. The dispute
concerned damages for breach of contract to manufacture
and deliver 99 jet airplanes. Eastern's primary expert wit-
ness placed damages from delivery delays at $23,400,000.
McDonnell's expert opined that Eastern had actually
saved at least $1,294,000 due to the late delivery. The
discrepancy was a mere $24,600,000. A jury awarded
Eastern some $25 million in damages. 14 7
The Fifth Circuit in reversing and remanding for a new
trial, observed that estimating a major airline's lost profits
based on such facts as the case presented was a tremen-
dously complicated project.' 48 The court pointed out that
the trial judge had the discretion to call an expert witness
of its own.' 49 The panel reasoned:
141 See Report by Special Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York: Impartial Medical Testimony (1956), local adoption endorsed by the
American Bar Ass'n, 82 A.B.A. Rep. 184-185 (1957).
14 FED. R. EVID. 706 Advisory Committee note.
'44 See Gartner v. Hendrix, No. Civ. A-90-4980, 1991 WL 162121 (E.D. La.
1991)(noting that "nary a peep was heard" from any party regarding disenchant-
ment with the court-appointed medical expert until after the doctor issued his
report).
45 FED. R. EvID. 706 Advisory Committee note.
14; 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976).
141 Id. at 961.
148 Id. at 1000.
14 Id.
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Because a court-appointed witness would be unconcerned
with either promoting or attacking a particular estimate of
Eastern's damages, he could provide an objective insight
into the $24.5 million difference of opinion between the
parties' experts. Indeed, the mere presence of a neutral
expert may have, in Judge Prettyman's phrase, "a great
tranquilizing effect" on the experts retained by Eastern
and McDonnell. ' 0
While Rule 706's provision for appointed experts is ide-
ally suited for technically complex cases, it is not without
critics. In fact, case law shows that some judges reject the
whole concept of court-appointed experts as a direct at-
tack on the adversarial system. In Kian v. Mirro Aluminum
Co. 5 ' the court, in a complicated breach of patent license
case, denied the defendant's motion to appoint an impar-
tial expert to inform the jury what the case was about.
The judge found that the issues were within the grasp of
the jury, and reasoned that the presence of the court-
sponsored witness could create a strong, if not over-
whelming, impression of impartiality and objectivity,
which "could potentially transform the trial by jury into a
trial by witness."'' 52
Other judges appear to embrace the use of court-ap-
pointed experts. In Repetitive Stress Injury Cases Pending in
the U.S. Dist. Court for the Eastern Dist. of New York v. Northern
Telecom, Inc. 153 the trial judge was faced with a number of
suits for injuries to the wrist and hand (Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome) allegedly caused by the routine use of com-
puters, adding machines, supermarket checkout scanners
and other mechanical and electrical devices. The court in-
dicated that a court-appointed panel of experts, in mass
150 Id. (citations omitted). In Ohio Public Interest Campaign v. Fisher Foods,
Inc., 546 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio 1982), the court appointed an advisor to interpret
data in a food retailer's price fixing case after the parties could not agree on the
data and methodologies to use in calculating damages.
i5 88 F.R.D. 351, 355-56 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
1-2 Id. at 356. The judge in Kian also denied the defendant's motion to strike
plaintiffs demand for a jury trial. Id. at 355. Defendant had contended that the
case was too complex for a jury to understand.
153 142 F.R.D. 584 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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litigation cases, might contribute to an overall effort to
"minimize litigation costs and to help achieve satisfactory
resolution of individual cases when scientific information
concerning injuries and causation and the legal theories
of the cases are fully developed at an early state of the
litigation." 54
The court stated that such appointed experts could be
shared in order to eliminate redundant testimony and ex-
penses.' 55 The court also advocated use of court-ap-
pointed panels of experts "both to advise the court on
scientific matters and to develop protocols for design and
use by employees that may help reduce the probability of
future harm."'' 56 The court concluded, "By involving ex-
perts and representatives of workers, producers and the
medical profession who are significantly affected by the
litigation, the judicial process can serve a proactive as well
as a compensatory function."'' 57
Appointment of impartial experts at an early stage in
the litigation not only helps the judge and the parties
more readily bring complex issues into focus, but it could
avert the types of discovery harassment which are becom-
ing more and more common with regard to experts. Fur-
thermore, knowledge that an impartial expert would be
involved in the case could deter frivolous lawsuits. The
practice could also result in earlier resolution of litigation
on summary judgment.
For example, in Hemstreet v. Burroughs Corp. ,158 use of an
impartial expert in a patent case led to a summary judg-
ment. Plaintiff, the losing party, argued that granting
summary judgment was improper because the court un-
fairly relied on the court-appointed expert to resolve sev-
eral genuine issues of material fact. The court rejected
the argument, pointing out that the expert was appointed




158 1987 WL 13994 (N.D. Il. 1987).
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to "increase the court's understanding of the technical
matters presented."1 59 The expert was strictly instructed
to confine his analysis to a review of the materials submit-
ted by the parties. The court stated that the expert
offered no independent findings, conclusions, or recom-
mendations, and that the decision to grant summary judg-
ment was based on the evidence submitted by the
parties. 60 The court concluded:
A busy trial court faced with complex technology may re-
quire independent education or analysis if it is to under-
stand the technology before the trial. The parties
nominated [the expert] and agreed that he is an independ-
ent expert. If a motion for summary judgment appears to
have merit a court will need some education about the
technology at an earlier stage of the proceedings but it will
not need independent findings. That is this case. What
was sought here was an independent explanation of the
technology and assistance in understanding the positions
of the parties' experts.' 6'
Complex issues of science and technology play an ever
increasing role in litigation. 62 We truly live in the Infor-
mation Age where data, statistics, facts of all kinds are at
one's fingertips due to media saturation and computer-
based information systems.. Product liability, patent, anti-
trust, trademark, securities, employment rights, contract,
toxic tort and other contexts within which litigation oc-
curs will only become more fact, science and technology
intense. The adversarial system must evolve with the real-
ities of our age if confidence is to be maintained in the
outcome of litigation. Undeniably, the rules of procedure
are shaped by social, political and economic factors. 163
The medieval ordeals were halted when society advanced
to a point where their methods of proof were no longer
'59 Id. at 1.
160 Id.
16 1 Id. at 2.
"2 See Tackling High Tech, NAT'L LJ. Oct. 19, 1992, at 1; One Opinion, Two Con-
troversies, ABAJ. Sept. 1992, at 26.
16. See Richardson, supra, note 1, § 1.2 at 3.
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perceived as reliable. Conceivably, Rule 706 provides the
procedural mechanism to maintain confidence in the judi-
cial system in this Information Age.
F. EXPERT WITNESSES: FORM OVER SUBSTANCE TODAY
Nevertheless, preliminary results of a recent study con-
cerning the role of court-appointed experts which was un-
dertaken by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) shows that
judges seldom employ Rule 706.'64 Barriers to the ap-
pointment of experts are diverse, according to the judges
polled by the FJC. One barrier noted is that parties
rarely request a court appointed expert. A second barrier
is the judge's fear of an appearance of impropriety should
ex parte communications between the judge and the ex-
pert occur.' 65 Judges also raised the practical problem of
the expert's compensation. The study found that many
parties are reluctant to pay experts whom they did not re-
tain and who offer testimony fatal to their case. More-
over, problems arise when an indigent party is unable to
pay his share or when a party fails to pay his share to the
expert, thus requiring the judge to follow additional pro-
cedures to enforce payment.
Practical problems aside, the principal reason both
judges and attorneys look warily at Rule 706 is because of
a court appointed expert's potential to affect a case out-
come.16 6 The FJC study found that the outcomes of cases
which used a court-appointed expert were generally con-
sistent with the expert's advice. ' 67 The authors point out,
however, "since an inability to decide the case without an
'64 Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts,
FJC Directions, August 1992.
165 Judges polled by the FJC expressed frustration that Rule 706 only addresses
use of appointed experts as testifying witnesses. Several judges state that the rule
should address use of appointed experts as technical advisors in pretrial proceed-
ings. Id. at 13.
i, Kian, supra note 151.
167 The study found:
Of fifty-eight responses to this question [Do experts affect out-
come?] . . . , only two indicated that the result was not consistent
with the guidance given by the expert. Both of these cases involved
[59
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independent expert was a prerequisite to the appoint-
ment, it follows that the testimony of the appointed ex-
pert is likely to be persuasive."' 68
Attorneys fear the expert will take the case out of their
hands. On their part, judges appoint experts only in cases
they deem otherwise unresolvable. Clearly, the issue of
court-appointed experts goes to the heart of the adver-
sarial system. In fact, the FJC study found, "A number of
judges acknowledged that relying only on parties' experts
• ..may hinder a reasoned solution to the conflict, but
found such concerns to be outweighed by the importance
of maintaining the adversarial system and the control ex-
ercised by the parties in the presentation of evidence."'' 69
Consider that statement again. The adversarial system
and party control of proceedings are more important to
these judges than a reasoned decision. Is this not form
over substance? Have we come full circle? Centuries ago,
trial by ordeal was abandoned when society lost confi-
dence in the method's ability to provide a fair and honest
solution to a dispute. The whole system was abandoned
when trial by ordeal and oath came to be perceived as
promoting form over substance, when it became apparent
that the methods of trial were more important than the
result. Are the partisan experts of today, sought out and
paid for by a party to bolster that party's case, no different
than the oath helpers of centuries ago? Perhaps the ad-
versarial system's reliance on partisan expert witnesses to
reveal the truth is a figurative and literal ordeal which has
become obsolete.
Is the end near for the use of experts? Or is the end
near for the use of partisan experts? Only time will tell.
And as a review of the evolution of expert witness use
shows, time, indeed, will tell.
bench trials in which the judge pursued a legal analysis that was in-
dependent of the technical issues.
Id. at 14.
161 Id. at 14.
169 Id. at 8.
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